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Natural disasters and informal risk sharing against illness:  
networks vs. groups 
 
Abstract 
Using original household panel survey data collected in rural Fiji, this paper demonstrates 
how informal risk-sharing institutions upon which poor people heavily rely in times of 
illness are vulnerable to natural disasters. First, household private cash-inkind transfers 
do not serve as insurance against illness in the relief phase (several months after the 
disaster); they do so only after pooled resources are recovered in the reconstruction phase 
(a few years later) (i.e., the resource effect). Second, risk-sharing arrangements are 
dependent on the history of labor-time transfers corresponding to housing damage: Only 
disaster non-victims are insured against illness, because victims have already received 
labor help for their rehabilitation from non-victims (i.e., the reciprocity effect). The paper 
also reveals that resource/reciprocity effects exist in endogenously formed networks and 
pre-formed groups, as risk-sharing pools to a similar degree. Not only do private transfers 
exchanged among households serve as insurance, but also, household contributions 
directly made to groups – such as ritual gifts and religious donations – contain risk-
sharing components against illness among group members. Although the former finding 
is commonly evident in the literature, the latter is new. Network formation is directly 
related to pre-formed groups, especially kin and religious ones.   
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I.  Introduction 
Informal risk-sharing institutions are critically important in poor populations (see, 
e.g., Alderman and Paxon 1994; Morduch 1999; and Dercon 2002 for reviews of 
informal insurance). They are particularly important for health shock, because neither 
health insurance nor public safety nets are available among the poor (see Strauss and 
Thomas 1998 for their extensive review of the health-development nexus). Numerous 
studies have shown that informal risk sharing against idiosyncratic shocks, such as illness, 
is available in developing areas, although it is far from complete (e.g., Townsend 1994; 
Kochar 1995; Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Gertler and Gruber 2002; Asfaw and von 
Braun 2004). In contrast, such informal institutions are considered to be ineffective 
against covariate shocks, such as natural disasters, because shocks are highly correlated 
over space. Although extant works on risk sharing against natural disasters are scarce, 
recent studies provide evidence for such arrangements against household-level disaster 
shocks (e.g., Sawada and Shimizutani 2008; Mozumder et al. 2009). Of course, disaster 
relief plays a central role as a safety net. Post-disaster management is a time-consuming 
process, consisting of relief, recovery, and reconstruction phases (de Ville de Goyet 
2008). This paper addresses a question that researchers have not yet explored but is 
critically important for post-disaster development: How does a natural disaster affect 
informal risk sharing against illness over time? Although adverse effects of natural 
disasters on various dimensions of well-being, such as consumption, child nutrition, and 
public health, have received much attention from researchers (e.g., Noji 1997; Skoufias 
2003), no previous works explicitly address the link between natural disasters and 
informal risk sharing against health shocks.      4
I hypothesize two links. First, the degree of sharing cash and inkind (e.g., food) to 
smooth consumption against illness (non-labor sharing) depends on the amount of 
pooled resources that can be shared among people, i.e., the resource effect. In the relief 
phase right after the disaster, risk sharing against illness is weak or even nonexistent, 
simply because the covariate disaster shock greatly reduces pooled non-labor resources. 
As rehabilitation progresses, pooled resources and thus risk sharing make a recovery.  
Second, in the risk-sharing arrangement with limited enforceability, current 
transfers are dependent on the past history of transfers, i.e., the reciprocity effect (Ligon, 
Thomas, and Worrall 2002). The simulation analysis of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001, 
p390) demonstrates that “the existence of binding imperfect commitment constraints 
implies that households that have made net transfers in previous periods are less likely to 
provide subsequent transfers, given the current state of the world, than are households 
that have been net recipients of transfers” (they call this the transfer asset effect). La 
Ferrara (2003) theoretically and empirical examines the reciprocity effect in credit 
transactions among kin members in Ghana.   
Natural disasters can elicit the reciprocity effect as follows. Although a natural 
disaster is a region-wide covariate shock, it may contain significant idiosyncratic 
components at a local level; for example, a tropical cyclone may damage some, but not 
all dwellings within villages. Imagine a situation where there are disaster victims and 
non-victims within villages and in the relief phase non-victims help victims’ 
rehabilitation by providing labor time (labor sharing). Note that even if the resource 
effect precludes non-labor sharing against the disaster damage, labor sharing can still 
work unless the disaster significantly lowers labor endowment among villagers (e.g.,   5
                                                
casualties, disease outbreak, out-migration). Thus, the reciprocity effect suggests that 
victims are less insured against illness than non-victims are.  
As such, natural disasters may adversely affect informal risk sharing not only for 
all contemporaneously, but also for some in a persistent manner; in particular, disaster 
victims may suffer from a lack of private safety nets against illness over time. Then, even 
if disaster-induced public-health problems are not a major issue, “hidden” health 
problems exacerbated by the disaster – through endogenous adjustments in informal risk-
sharing arrangements – can be considerable. Using original household panel survey data 
collected in rural Fiji, the paper shows that a tropical cyclone has strong resource and 
reciprocity effects: Sick persons are insured in the reconstruction phase, but not in the 
relief phase; sick non-victims are insured, but sick victims are not.        
To test the reciprocity effect, the paper directly analyzes household private 
transfers; distinct from many extant studies of risk sharing that focus on consumption 
smoothing, it thus explores how people share risk, in the same spirit as Udry (1994) and 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003). Although economists have extensively studied private 
transfers exchanged among households (across-household transfers) (see, e.g., Cox and 
Fafchamps 2008 for a review), transfers exchanged directly with groups to which the 
household belongs – such as ritual gifts for kin groups, village communal work, and 
church donations (household-group transfers) – have received very limited attention.
1 
This is a significant lacuna in the risk-sharing literature, because household-group 
transfers may contain a significant risk-sharing component, such that group members 
 
1 This is especially so in developing countries; in developed countries, in contrast, 
transfers to community institutions in general (e.g., charitable giving) have been well 
studied (see, e.g., Schokkaert 2006 for review).   6
with adverse shock contribute less than others do. As a unique feature, the Fijian data 
include comparable household information about these two forms of transfers, enabling 
their direct comparison. Osili, Deb, and Okten (forthcoming) conduct a similar 
comparison using Indonesian Family Life Surveys, though risk sharing is not their focus. 
The paper finds resource and reciprocity effects of the cyclone in both transfers.  
Although economists often highlight the village as a risk-sharing pool because of 
its information and enforcement advantages (e.g., Townsend 1994; Ligon, Thomas, and 
Worrall 2002), recent works directly address the question of among whom people share 
risk. Some researchers focus on pre-formed groups other than village, such as kin, caste, 
and ethnic groups (e.g., Grimard 1997; Morduch 2005; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009), 
while others study the formation of risk-sharing groups and networks (e.g., Murgai et al. 
2002; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006). The paper examines not 
only which pre-formed groups serve as risk-sharing groups in household-group transfers, 
but also how those groups form household transfer networks and what networks serve as 
risk-sharing networks in across-household transfers. The findings reveal that kin and 
religious networks and groups are important.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the study area, 
the cyclone, and health shock. Section III explains household private transfers. Section 
IV develops empirical strategies to test the resource and reciprocity effects, which is 
followed by the results in Section V. The last section concludes. 
II. Data, cyclone, and health 
A.  Study area and data   7
                                                
On January 13, 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern regions of 
the Fiji Islands.
2 Seven native Fijian villages on the coast in the northern region, with 
distinct environmental and economic conditions, were intentionally chosen for the 
survey.
3 After being stratified for each of the selected villages by the smallest kin group 
unit (defined shortly), as well as by a combination of leadership status (e.g., kin leader) 
and major asset holdings (e.g., shops), households were randomly sampled in each 
stratum. Household interviews were conducted between late August and early November 
2003, collecting information about demographics, assets, production, income, shocks, 
relief, and transfers (but not consumption). As such, like other post-disaster surveys (e.g., 
Morris et al. 2002), the survey collected disaster information retrospectively (I will 
discuss retrospective errors in Section IV). In July-September 2005, the second wave of 
the survey was implemented. Analyses in this paper are conducted for 226 households 
with complete panel data. All monetized values presented in the paper are real values, 
with 2003 as the base year.   
B.  Cyclone shock 
All seven sample villages experienced damage to their structures and facilities, 
and housing damage and crop damage are the two major damages that individual 
households experienced. According to respondents’ subjective assessments, the cyclone 
 
2 Ami was the only cyclone in the northern region from 1991 through 2005 (McKenzie, 
Prasad, and Kaloumaira 2005). The total damage caused by Cyclone Ami across the 
country is estimated at F$104 million, of which housing damage is F$22 million and crop 
damage is F$40 million  (National Disaster Management Office 2003). 
3 Two other villages were also surveyed in 2003, but not in 2005. Four and three villages, 
respectively, are located on Vanua Levu and Taveuni Islands, the second- and third-
largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti Levu, 
where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses are 
situated. Fiji is divided almost evenly between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians. The study 
focuses on native Fijians.   8
                                                
damaged 58% of residents’ houses: 9% were completely destroyed and 49% were 
partially damaged (see Table 1). Households with and without damaged housing did not 
significantly differ from each other in their crop damage (discussed next), earned 
incomes, asset holdings, and other household characteristics at the time of interviews in 
2003 (nor were they different before the cyclone, Takasaki forthcoming-b). Among 
households that experienced housing damage, 36% became refugees who stayed in 
others’ residences in the same village (permanent migration was nonexistent). About two 
thirds of those refugees lived with households in the same kin group; that is, kin networks 
served as a major risk-sharing pool. Households without damaged housing also helped 
others’ rehabilitation (I return to this below).  
Almost all households engaged in cropping (and fishing),
4 and 82% experienced 
crop damage. The mean value of damaged crops was F$44 per capita (1 Fiji dollar = 
US$.60), which was 11% of the mean annual crop income at the time of interviews in 
2003 (crop damage was calculated based on the quantity damaged for each major crop, as 
reported by respondents).
5 Distinct from housing rehabilitation, households individually 
rehabilitated cropping by collecting harvestable damaged crops, cleaning fields, and 
planting seeds with no labor sharing involved. Annual total earned income in 2003 was 
about half of that in 2005; thus, aggregated resources that could be shared among 
households were limited after the cyclone.    
 
4 Farming and fishing, respectively, accounted for 50% and 27% of total earned income 
in 2003 and 55% and 14% of total earned income in 2005. Households employ traditional 
farming practices, using no mechanized equipment or animal traction to produce taro, 
cassava, coconut, and kava plants, and engage in artisanal fishing, using lines and hooks, 
simple spear guns, or rudimentary nets.  
5 Correlations of housing damage with crop damage and crop-damage value are .041 
and .079, respectively, with no statistical significance.   9
                                                
Variance of the household-level cyclone-damage measures is decomposed into 
year, village, and household levels by allowing for year-level or time-varying village-
level means.
6 Apart from the major contribution of the year-level variance to the total 
variance for the cyclone-damage dummies, most variance exists at the household level 
(57-90%). In contrast, the contribution of village-level variance to the total variance is 
negligible (less than 3%). This is because as the survey covers only the northern region in 
the small island state, variations in village-level shocks in the study area are limited. As 
such, although the cyclone is a region-wide covariate shock, household-level cyclone 
damages in 2003 are largely idiosyncratic within villages.  
C.  Relief and reconstruction 
The Red Cross, other nongovernmental organizations, and governments 
provisioned relief, and interviews in 2003 were conducted at the end of the relief phase. 
Almost all households received emergency food aid, and the mean amount per capita was 
F$95, which was more than twice the mean crop damage; in contrast, only a small 
proportion of victims received tarpaulins that could be used as emergency shelters and for 
temporary dwelling repair. At the time of interviews in 2003, refugees were almost 
nonexistent and about two thirds of households with damaged housing had completed 
rehabilitation: 12% had built a new house and 52% had completed repairs. As the 
government provisioned most construction materials from 2004, these housing 
rehabilitations were accomplished through people’s mutual help. By the time of 
interviews in 2005 in the late reconstruction phase, construction materials had been 
 
6 In practice, the year-level variance (percent of total variance) is the R-squared of a 
regression on a year dummy; the village-level variance is the R-squared of a regression 
on a full set of village-time dummies, minus the year-level variance.   10
                                                
provisioned to one quarter of households in the sample. Takasaki (forthcoming-a; 
forthcoming-b) details and analyzes allocations of reconstruction and relief funds, 
respectively.  
D.  Health shock 
Respondents were asked each household member’s health conditions over the past 
year. In both 2003 and 2005, about one third of households had one or more sick 
members – 72% and 84% of those had one or more sick adults, respectively – and 12% of 
households experienced illness in both years (Table 1). According to the variance 
decomposition, household-level illnesses are mostly idiosyncratic shocks within villages. 
Public-health problems were not a major issue after the cyclone in the sample villages – 
respondents reported no casualties and very limited injuries and illnesses directly caused 
by the cyclone. Illness, however, was more common among households with damaged 
housing than others in 2003 (with a .13 correlation);
7 the prevalence of illness was almost 
the same for refugees and non-refugees. Although illness was not more pervasive in 2003 
than in 2005, housing damage, not refugee status, may have caused some health 
problems; housing damage did not cause chronic illnesses though, because these two 
variables were uncorrelated for 2005. 
III. Household private transfers 
A.  Groups 
Apart from the village, kin, religious, and social groups play major roles in 
Fijians’ life. First, each native Fijian belongs to a lineage of the vanua-yavusa-mataqali-
 
7 Illness was less common among households with damaged crops than others (with a -
.14 correlation); there was no significant correlation between illness and crop damage 
value.   11
                                                
tokatoka hierarchy: Vanua consists of several yavusa; yavusa consists of several 
mataqali; and mataqali consists of several tokatoka (Ravuvu 1983). Although vanua 
ranges over several villages, there is just one yavusa in each of the sample villages (i.e., 
village formation is based on yavusa); mataqali and tokatoka are village subgroups (the 
sample covers 22 mataqali and 35 tokatoka). Many ritual activities, such as funerals and 
weddings, are organized by mataqali and yavusa.
8 Second, Christianity underlies Fijian 
society, and church donations are quite significant, as shown below. A religious group 
formed for each church, which often covers more than one nearby village, is available in 
all villages in the sample – 3.9 church groups per village on average – and almost all 
households are members. Third, social groups consist of women’s, school, and youth 
groups in all villages (market-oriented groups such as cooperatives are almost 
nonexistent). Although membership is fixed for kin and religious groups (without 
conversion to another religion),
9 participation in social groups is based on individual 
decisions among the eligible – determined by gender, child schooling, and age – and 86% 
of households belong to at least one social group. When these pre-formed groups are 
considered as potential risk-sharing groups, group formation is irrelevant.  
B.  Transfer data 
 
8 The dominant symbol of Fijian culture is kava (a beverage infused from the root of a 
pepper plant, Piper methysticum), and kava rituals frequently involve exchanges of 
ceremonial goods, such as food, mats, and bark cloth (Turner 1987). Land is communally 
owned by mataqali (about 83% of the country’s total land is communal), and customary 
rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or several yavusa. 
9 Marriage across different kin groups is common. This paper focuses on the kin groups 
to which households currently belong; if the kin groups to which individuals used to 
belong prior to marriage are considered, transfer networks concentrate more on own kin 
groups (especially tokatoka) than what is shown below.   12
                                                
In both 2003 and 2005 surveys, respondents were asked not only about each 
major transfer received from and given to other households, but also the transfers they 
contributed to and received directly from each kin, religious, and social group to which 
they belonged, as well as the village, in the past year. Three caveats are noted. First, 
distinct from extant studies in the Pacific region (Bertram 1986), overseas remittances are 
almost nonexistent.
10 Second, although transfer measures capture not only cash and 
inkind, but also labor time in 2005, labor-time transfer data in 2003 are limited to 
communal labor contributed to groups. Third, although the transfers that the household 
offers to groups include all the resources it contributes, those it receives from the group 
capture only partial benefits, excluding those of local public goods that the group 
provides, such as social activities and village upkeep. Measuring such benefits is very 
difficult, because they often include unobservable, non-economic benefits and can be 
realized over a long time horizon (Clotfelter 1992). Reflecting this imbalance, transfers 
given to groups are much more common and greater than those received from groups. In 
contrast, the across-household transfer data are balanced in coverage between receipt and 
giving.  
Proportion of participation in and mean amounts of annual transfers received and 
given per capita in each year are reported in Table 2 – cash-inkind in panel A and labor 
time in panel B (labor time is monetized based on men’s daily wage in each village, the 
 
10 In contrast, according to the household survey conducted in five major towns and nine 
villages in Viti Levu in 2005 by the World Bank (2006), 26% of 211 native Fijian 
households have overseas migrants and 34% received overseas remittances. This 
indicates a potentially significant difference in Fijians’ transfer patterns between the main 
island and other islands and between urban and rural areas (cf. note 3). This issue 
deserves more research.   13
                                                
mean of which is about F$14).
11 Household-group transfers are quite significant, 
especially in 2005: Gross cash-inkind and labor-time transfers contributed to groups are 
2.8 and 7.4 times, respectively, those given to other households.  
C.  Relief vs. reconstruction phases 
A comparison of the relief period 2003 with the reconstruction period 2005 
reveals a sharp contrast between cash-inkind and labor-time transfers. On the one hand, 
non-labor resources that could be shared among households were limited: Cash-inkind 
transfers received from other households and given to groups in 2003 were much less 
common and smaller than those in 2005 (cash-inkind transfers given to other households 
were similar over time, mainly because of large transfers made for funerals in 2003). On 
the other hand, group members contributed significant labor time to rehabilitate group 
facilities, such as village facilities (e.g., community halls), churches, and schools (i.e., 
labor sharing against group-level covariate shock): Labor-time transfers given to the 
village and religious and social groups in 2003 were more common and much greater 
than those in 2005; the converse holds true for kin groups, as no kin groups owned or 
managed group facilities, and ritual transfers to them increased in 2005.
12 Although the 
cyclone significantly reduced pooled, non-labor resources, labor-time endowment was 
largely intact, because of no cyclone-induced casualties and permanent migration and 
limited cyclone-induced diseases. Along with the patterns of housing rehabilitations 
 
11 Informal loans were much smaller than gifts, and when informal loans are added to 
private transfers, results are almost the same as what are presented here.  
12 Kin-group transfers include those made with yavusa, mataqali, and tokatoka, because 
comparable data for vanua are lacking for 2003 (transfers with vanua were minor in 
2005).   14
discussed above, this suggests that across-household, labor-time transfers in 2003 were 
also more common and greater than those in 2005.  
D.  Transfer networks 
Respondents were also asked about the characteristics of each household with 
which transfers were made. Major transfer networks are in-village, kin, and religious 
ones (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007 obtain similar findings in the Philippines): Cash-
inkind transfers received from other households in the village, in the same tokatoka, and 
in the same religious group are more common and much greater than those out of the 
village, in other tokatoka, and in other church groups, respectively, in both 2003 and 
2005 (disaggregated data by religion are lacking in 2003); this is also mostly true for 
labor-time transfers in 2005. Although transfer networks are endogenously formed by 
individual households, their network formation is directly related to kin and religious 
groups they cannot choose.      
IV. Econometric specification 
A.  Base model 
I start by estimating the across-household transfer equation using the following 
standard, fixed-effects specification: 
it i t
k
itk k it it e u V X h y + + + + = ∑η α ,      ( 1 )  
where yit is household i’s net transfer received from other households in time t; hit is a 
dummy for illness among any household members; Xitk is a series of household-level 
factors that affect transfer decisions; Vt is time-varying village dummies, which capture 
village-level covariate shock; ui is household heterogeneity; and eit is a time-variant error 
term that is individually and independently distributed. This base specification is the   15
                                                
same as equation (1) in Gertler and Gruber (2002), although their focus is not on private 
transfers. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) derive equation (1) from a full risk-sharing model 
(Cochrane 1991; Mace 1991; Townsend 1994). The fixed-effects estimator controls for 
all household and village fixed effects. If private transfers are ex-post, risk-sharing 
arrangements among villagers with given pooled resources in the village, households 
with illness receive more transfers, i.e., α > 0.  
B.  Resource and reciprocity effects 
Theoretically, under imperfect labor and housing-market conditions, people seek 
to smooth utility determined by consumption, leisure, and housing quality (a decrease in 
housing quality because of the disaster is a preference shock), and risk sharing consists of 
non-labor sharing to smooth consumption against illness (income shock) and labor 
sharing for housing rehabilitation. I extend equation (1) in the following four steps.  
First, I add household-level disaster damage, in particular, housing damage 
(dummy), dit, as a control.
13 The panel data consist of relief period 1 and reconstruction 
period 2, and di2 = 0 for all i (no disaster in period 2). In period 1, households are either 
disaster victims or non-victims, and in the labor sharing against housing damage, victims 
receive labor-time transfers from non-victims, i.e., β1 > 0, where β1 is a coefficient of di1. 
Second, I allow heterogeneous responses of private transfers to illness over time, by 
replacing α with αt. The resource effect suggests that non-labor sharing against illness 
better works in period 2 than in period 1; it is ineffective in period 1 if pooled resources 
are sufficiently low, i.e., 0 ≤ α1 < α2. Third, I make transfer responses to shocks in period 
1 – cash-inkind transfers to illness and labor-time transfers to disaster damage – 
 
13 If illness is correlated with housing damage (as found above), omitting the latter causes 
bias in the estimated α.   16
heterogeneous by adding an interaction term, hi1di1. This captures the contemporaneous 
link of household-level disaster damage with risk sharing against illness.  
Last, to capture the reciprocity effect, I allow transfer responses to illness in 
period 2 to vary, depending on the disaster damage experienced in period 1, by adding an 
interaction term, hi2di1. The final model is 
it i t
k
itk k i i i i i it t it e u V X d h d h d h y + + + + + + + = ∑η γ γ β α 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 .   (2)   
This reduced-form specification does not identify how the history of transfers affects the 
current transfer; a lack of labor-time transfer information in period 1 in the Fijian data 
precludes a structural-form specification – using yi1 as a determinant of yi2 with cyclone 
damage di1 as an excluded instrument. Equation (2) assumes that risk sharing against 
illness in period 2 depends on the outcome of risk sharing against disaster damage, not 
illness, in period 1; that is, it captures the potential reciprocity effect of disaster damage 
only. Since researchers cannot observe the complete history of transfers, this empirical 
strategy is practically attractive if they know what particular shocks can cause the 
reciprocity effect. An advantage of this reduced-form specification is that the history of 
risk sharing is inclusive, capturing all forms of mutual help among households, including 
those that are not measured by standard transfer data, such as co-residence for refugees.   
The reciprocity effect suggests that risk sharing against illness in period 2 works 
better among non-victims than victims, i.e., γ2 < 0; the marginal effects of illness in 
period t are αt for non-victims and αt + γt for victims, and in an extreme case, risk sharing 
against illness is still ineffective among victims in period 2, i.e., γ2 = -α2. I also estimate 
equation (2) for the non-victim (N) sample and the victim (V) sample separately (di1, 
hi1di1, and hi2di1 vanish); the reciprocity effect suggests that 0 ≤ α2
V < α2
N.    17
C.  Cash-inkind vs. labor-time transfers 
Ideally, I would conduct complete tests of my conjectures by estimating equation 
(2) for cash-kind and labor-time transfers separately, but this is infeasible with the lack of 
a complete panel of labor-time transfers in Fiji. All I can do is test the resource and 
reciprocity effects on non-labor sharing against illness; I cannot test whether labor time is 
shared against disaster damage in period 1. I compare housing damage and crop damage 
(another income shock) as a source of the potential reciprocity effect (β1 and γt are 
vectors). I conjecture that the reciprocity effect of housing damage is stronger than that of 
crop damage. This is because labor-sharing against housing damage is stronger than that 
against crop damage (the latter was actually nonexistent). Put differently, if the strong 
reciprocity effect of housing damage is found despite the absence of non-labor sharing 
against housing damage, this gives indirect evidence for strong labor sharing against 
housing damage in period 1, as I conjecture.  
D.  Household-group transfers 
I analyze household-group transfers in a way comparable to the analysis of 
across-household transfers. If household-group transfers in period 2 – mainly for local 
public-goods provisions – are risk-sharing arrangements against illness among group 
members, those with illness contribute less to groups than others do. If groups are the 
same as villages, group-level covariate shocks, as well as all time-variant, group-level 
factors, are captured by village-time dummies, and equation (2) can be directly used to 
test the resource/reciprocity effects on household-group transfers. In addition to net 
transfers received from groups, I also estimate gross transfers contributed to groups   18
separately, because decisions about transfers received from and given to groups are made 
by different agents and what these two cover is unbalanced in the transfer data. 
The reciprocity effect on household-group cash-inkind transfers can occur in two 
ways. First, household-group labor-time transfers in period 1 – mainly for group-level 
rehabilitation – may also serve as risk-sharing arrangements against household-level 
disaster damage. This reciprocity within groups can be tested by estimating equation (2) 
for gross labor-time transfers given to groups. Second, across-household labor-time 
transfers in period 1 – for housing rehabilitation – may affect non-labor sharing among 
group members in period 2. This type of reciprocity is likely if household risk-sharing 
networks significantly overlap pre-formed groups. In Fiji, because major transfer 
networks consist of kin and religious affiliations, that the reciprocity effect exists mainly 
in kin and religious networks and groups provides evidence for this reciprocity between 
networks and groups, which suggests that the formation of not only transfer networks in 
general, but also risk-sharing networks are directly related to pre-formed groups.  
E.  Covariates 
Household-level disaster damage dit is captured by a dummy for housing damage, 
the value of crop damage per capita, and their interaction. Household crop damage is 
endogenous, because unobservable household and village characteristics, such as land 
quality, farming skills, and market and environmental conditions, which affect household 
pre-cyclone cropping decisions and thus crop damage, can be correlated with its transfer 
decisions. Most of these unobservable factors are fixed effects, which can be controlled 
for by the fixed-effects estimator. Housing quality, such as construction materials and 
micro location within villages, which might influence housing damage, may be correlated   19
                                                
with household transfers; such pre-cyclone housing quality is also a fixed effect. Time-
variant household characteristics Xitk are captured by household size.
14 Village-time 
dummies capture all village-level factors: time-variant market and environmental 
conditions, village-level shocks to housing and crops (which are shown above to be 
small), damage to village structures and facilities, and relief and construction materials 
received by the village.
15 For disaggregated transfers, alternative specifications are 
employed to better capture network- and group-level covariate shocks, as detailed in the 
next section. A time dummy controls for region-level covariate shocks, seasonality, and 
other common events or trends.   
F.  Measurement errors 
Although errors in the measurement of housing damage are minimal, because 
relief officers used the same categories for their damage assessments (the damage status 
of each house was common knowledge among villagers), errors in the value of crop 
damage could be considerable and systematic. I repeated the analyses using the crop-
damage dummy, the errors of which should be minimal, finding qualitatively the same 
results; dropping the crop-damage variable (and its interaction terms) does not 
significantly alter the remaining results, either. Although the subjective health measure, 
which is commonly used in household surveys, can contain significant measurement 
errors because of heterogeneous definitions of illness among respondents and their 
 
14 As an alternative specification, I use land and fishing capital holdings as additional 
controls, finding results very similar to those presented below. Though these productive 
assets could be endogenous if they are adjusted to shocks (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), 
the results suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. 
15 Relief and construction materials received by individual households are not included as 
explanatory variables, because they are endogenously determined as part of private risk 
sharing within villages (Dercon and Krishnan 2005; Takasaki forthcoming-a, b).   20
systematic misreporting (Strauss and Thomas 1998), the fixed-effects estimator helps 
reduce these problems.  
The correlation of recall errors in private transfers with household-level shocks 
can cause bias. Specifically, a positive (negative) correlation – households with larger 
shocks tend to report higher (lower) net private transfers received than actual transfers – 
causes upward (downward) bias. If such a potential correlation with illness does not 
change significantly over time, it is controlled for by the fixed-effects estimator, and the 
estimated positive α2 (resource effect) should be robust. This correlation still matters for 
disaster damage that occurred only in period 1. Unless the correlation is negative and 
large in magnitude, estimated negative γ2 (reciprocity effect) should be qualitatively 
robust; its robustness is further buttressed by consistent results of the subsample analysis.   
V.  Estimation results 
 
A.  Aggregated transfers 
The fixed-effects estimates of determinants of annual net cash-inkind transfers 
received per capita from other households and groups are shown in Table 3 (village-time 
dummies are used as controls and robust standard errors are reported). When cyclone 
damage is ignored (equation 1), transfers positively respond to illness, but the result is not 
statistically significant (column 1). When cyclone-damage variables are added, the 
estimated coefficient for illness does not change and no cyclone-damage variables yield 
significant results (column 2); that is, non-labor sharing was ineffective against housing 
and crop damage. The resource effect strongly holds: Although transfers were insensitive 
to illness in 2003, they significantly responded to illness in 2005 (the estimated marginal 
effect is F$100, or equivalently about two thirds of the mean gross transfers received)   21
                                                
(column 3). None of the interaction terms of illness in 2003 with cyclone damage yielded 
significant impacts (column 4); that is, household-level cyclone damage does not 
contemporaneously affect risk sharing against illness. The reciprocity effect of housing 
damage is strong: In 2005, transfers responded to illness among households without 
damaged housing (about F$250 marginal effect), but not among others (the joint 
significance test for α2 + γ2 = 0 is insignificant); other interaction terms with crop damage 
are insignificant (column 5). This finding is consistent with my working hypothesis that 
housing damage distinguished between recipients and donors in labor sharing in period 1.   
In the remaining disaggregated analyses, I use the interaction term of illness in 
2005 with the housing-damage dummy only (γ2 is a scalar) to increase the degrees of 
freedom. Results of the estimated coefficients for illness in 2005 (α2) and its interaction 
with housing damage (γ2) in the whole sample and for illness in 2005 among households 
without damaged housing (α2
N) and among those with damaged housing (α2
V) are 
reported in Table 4. Potential selection bias in this subsample analysis is unlikely to be a 
major concern, because early descriptive findings suggest that housing damage is 
considered largely exogenous. Results for the aggregated transfers are almost the same as 
those in column (5) of Table 3, and the subsample analysis confirms that disaster non-
victims are insured against illness, but victims are not (panel A1 of Table 4).  
B.  Disaggregated transfers 
The resource and reciprocity effects hold not only in across-household transfers, 
but also in household-group transfers: When these two are estimated separately,
16 results 
 
16 In almost all disaggregated analyses discussed here, most households participate in 
transfers received or given in either 2003 or 2005 (Table 2); the only exception is 
transfers with social groups simply because 14% of households are not their members.   22
                                                                                                                                                
for the two effects are qualitatively the same, and marginal effects of illness in 2005 for 
non-victims (α2 or α2
N) are similar to each other (panel A1).   
It appears that the reciprocity effect on household-group transfers exists between 
networks and groups, and not within groups, for the following reasons. First, labor 
sharing within groups does not serve as risk sharing against housing damage: Gross 
(monetized) labor-time transfers given to groups are neutral to all household-level shocks 
(column 6 of Table 3); this is also true for disaggregated groups.   
Second, risk-sharing against illness through across-household transfers is mainly 
arranged in in-village and kin networks: Disaggregated results for in-village and tokatoka 
networks are similar to those for the aggregated networks, and the estimated marginal 
effects of illness in 2005 for non-victims are 70-83% of those for the aggregated 
networks (in proportion to the shares of in-village/in-tokatoka transfers in 2005) (panel 
A2 of Table 4). Although a similar analysis is infeasible for religious networks (with a 
lack of disaggregated panel data), the share of in-church transfers in 2005 is at a 
comparable level (Table 2). Replacing village-time dummies with tokatoka-time 
dummies for tokatoka networks does not significantly alter the results. Note that 
tokatoka-time dummies fully capture covariate shocks in the tokatoka networks, 
including out-of-village ones; on the other hand, village-time dummies fully capture 
covariate shocks in the in-village networks, but not in the aggregated networks, including 
out-of-village ones.  
Third, among pre-formed groups, kin and religious groups are major risk-sharing 
ones: Although results for the village and kin, religious, and social groups are 
 
When transfers with social groups only among members are considered, the results are 
very similar to those for the whole sample presented here.    23
qualitatively the same as those for the aggregated groups (with the exception that the 
estimated γ2 for the village is non-negative), the estimated marginal effects of illness in 
2005 for non-victims are considerable only for kin and religious groups (34-50% of those 
for all groups combined, which is greater than their shares in the aggregated group 
transfers given in 2005, 25-29%), and only those for religious groups are statistically 
significant (panel A3). Village-time dummies fully capture covariate shocks in the village, 
but not other groups. Using tokatoka-time dummies, which fully capture covariate shocks 
in kin groups (tokatoka is the smallest unit in the hierarchical kin structure), does not 
significantly alter the results. Similar results for religious groups are obtained under two 
alternative specifications: one using church-time dummies (three church dummies are 
defined for Methodist, Catholic, and other small sects combined) and another using 
village-church-time dummies (they are coarser and finer, respectively, than local church 
groups, which are formed for each church across nearby villages). It is not 
straightforward to construct group dummies for social groups that consist of women’s, 
school, and youth groups with overlapping memberships.  
All results for gross cash-inkind transfers given to groups are similar to those for 
net transfers received, with opposite signs (panel B), though the marginal effect for 
aggregated transfers in the subsample analysis is smaller in magnitude, with weaker 
statistical significance. Hence, risk-sharing arrangements against illness take place mostly 
in household contributions to groups.   
VI. Conclusion 
Using original household panel survey data collected in rural Fiji, this paper 
demonstrated how informal risk-sharing institutions upon which poor people heavily rely   24
when experiencing illness are vulnerable to natural disaster. First, household private, 
cash-inkind transfers do not serve as insurance against illness in the relief phase (several 
months after the cyclone); they do so only after pooled resources recover in the 
reconstruction phase (a few years later) (i.e., the resource effect). Second, risk-sharing 
arrangements depend on the history of labor-time transfers corresponding to housing 
damage: Only disaster non-victims are insured against illness, because victims already 
received labor help for their rehabilitation from non-victims (i.e., the reciprocity effect).  
The paper also revealed that the resource/reciprocity effects exist in endogenously 
formed networks and pre-formed groups, which serve as risk-sharing pools, to a similar 
degree. Not only do private transfers exchanged among households serve as insurance, 
but also, household contributions made directly to groups – such as ritual gifts and 
religious donations – contain risk-sharing components against illness among group 
members. Although the former finding is common in the literature, the latter is new. 
Network formation is directly related to pre-formed groups, especially kin and religious 
ones.  
These findings lead to the following policy and research implications. First, 
although it is crucial to better design and implement disaster relief/reconstruction (Amin 
and Goldstein 2008) and public-health programs to combat disaster-induced diseases 
(Noji 1997), these are not enough to prevent chronic health poverty. Policymakers need 
to strengthen broad public safety nets as a substitute for weakened private safety nets 
over extended post-disaster periods. Such efforts are necessary even if public health does 
not appear to be a major problem after the disaster; in fact, they may be even more 
necessary then, because available public-health programs are limited in such cases.    25
Second, it is necessary to augment local safety nets ex ante to combat less visible, 
post-disaster health problems. To this end, a better understanding of informal risk-sharing 
mechanisms among the poor is crucial. In Fiji, though the scope of informal risk sharing 
is greater than normally thought, fixed social relations – not only via kinship but also 
through religious affiliation – underlying local institutions need to receive explicit 
attention.  
Third, although economists have not paid much attention to informal risk sharing 
against natural disasters, labor sharing against their idiosyncratic components can be 
significant, determining subsequent risk-sharing arrangements against non-disaster 
shocks. More research on the link between natural disasters and informal risk sharing is 
needed. How much does labor sharing help rehabilitation from a disaster? How persistent 
is the reciprocity effect? How do people react to the reciprocity effect? These are 
important questions that this paper did not explore.  
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Housing damaged dummy 0.58 (0.49) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) - 40.8 2.2 57.0
Crop damaged dummy 0.82 (0.39) 0.00 (0.00) 0.80 (0.40) 0.83 (0.38) 0.537 69.3 0.8 29.9
Crop damage value per capita (F$) 44 (107) 0 (0) 34 (57) 52 (132) 0.235 7.9 2.6 89.5
Illness dummy 0.35 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.27 (0.45) 0.40 (0.49) 0.054 0.1 11.1 88.9
Illness in 2005 dummy
c - 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.843 ---
Household characteristics:
Annual earned income per capita (F$) 813 (1045) 1674 (1695) 823 (818) 805 (1186) 0.900
Annual public transfer received per capita (F$) 18 (81) 11 (48) 20 (87) 17 (77) 0.784
Household size 6.5 (2.9) 5.8 (2.7) 6.3 (2.7) 6.6 (3.0) 0.353
Age of household head 50 (14) 51 (14) 51 (14) 49 (13) 0.228
Female head dummy 0.13 (0.34) 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 0.939
Adult secondary education dummy 0.87 (0.34) 0.81 (0.39) 0.88 (0.32) 0.85 (0.35) 0.522
Land per capita (acre) 0.92 (1.19) 0.69 (1.55) 0.95 (1.13) 0.89 (1.23) 0.720
Fishing capital per capita (F$) 50 (150) 46 (228) 43 (154) 56 (148) 0.530
No. observations 226 226 95 131
2003 2005
Table 1. Shocks and household characteristics by housing damage.
a Household means are shown along with standard deviations in parentheses. 
b These are percents of total variance.
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Both 45% 43 (246) 87% 110 (172) 95% 145 (215) 100% 232 (262)
Across-household 42% 37 (240) 63% 67 (169) 94% 106 (170) 87% 61 (87)
Group-household 4% 6.0 (58) 68% 44 (61) 33% 39 (85) 99% 171 (235)
A2. Disaggregated across-household transfers
Location:
Same village 35% 26 (220) 54% 46 (146) 88% 59 (80) 86% 52 (74)
Other village or city 12% 11 (59) 23% 21 (77) 35% 44 (128) 15% 8.5 (37)
Kinship:
Same tokatoka 27% 28 (236) 37% 37 (145) 86% 67 (103) 80% 47 (72)
Other tokatoka 22% 9.5 (47) 41% 29 (75) 48% 38 (125) 42% 15 (44)
Religion:
Same religious group - - - - 80% 74 (146) 74% 49 (84)
Other religious group - - - - 26% 32 (97) 21% 12 (40)
A3. Disaggregated household-group transfers
Village 0% 0.1 (2.1) 42% 16 (40) 12% 4.0 (18) 80% 31 (47)
Kin groups 2% 5.5 (58) 19% 7.1 (22) 31% 29 (72) 81% 42 (69)
Religious groups 1% 0.3 (4.0) 32% 11 (24) 8% 4.8 (25) 96% 49 (84)
Social groups 0% 0.1 (1.1) 36% 10 (27) 5% 1.3 (7.7) 79% 49 (106)
B. Labor-time transfers
B1. Aggregated transfers
- - - - 46% 33 (96) 80% 104 (129)
Across-household - - - - 28% 21 (75) 28% 12 (33)
Group-household - - 97% 198 (184) 25% 12 (44) 80% 92 (112)
B2. Disaggregated across-household transfers
Location:
Same village - - - - 26% 14 (41) 28% 12 (32)
Other village or city - - - - 6% 7.0 (63) 4% 0.7 (5)
Kinship:
Same tokatoka - - - - 26% 11 (37) 26% 8.7 (25)
Other tokatoka - - - - 13% 9.9 (65) 13% 4.1 (16)
Religion:
Same religious group - - - - 19% 9.0 (35) 20% 6.5 (20)
Other religious group - - - - 10% 12 (67) 9% 5.9 (25)
B3. Disaggregated household-group transfers
Village - - 87% 99 (92) 8% 1.8 (7.8) 73% 36 (59)
Kin groups - - 19% 8.8 (34) 22% 6.3 (25) 56% 23 (41)
Religious groups - - 73% 49 (86) 5% 1.1 (10) 46% 12 (21)
Social groups - - 67% 42 (63) 4% 2.6 (23) 43% 21 (46)
2003 2005
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Table 3. Determinants of household private transfers - fixed effects.
(n=452) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
37.6 36.2
(47.9) (49.7)
-34.9 -29.9 -20.5 -99.1 31.3
(66.8) (66.5) (64.8) (75.4) (42.9)
-0.34 -0.38 -0.60 -0.60 0.22
(0.52) (0.52) (0.58) (0.67) (0.52)
0.55 0.54 0.61 0.68 -0.27
(0.53) (0.53) (0.59) (0.67) (0.54)
-19.7 -24.2 -12.2 -22.0
(71.3) (154.8) (158.2) (51.3)
99.8 * 96.5 * 253.6 ** -87.1













0.115 0.119 0.129 0.134 0.156 0.335
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Net annual cash-inkind transfers 
per capita received from other 
households and groups
Illness in 2005 * Housing damaged * 
Crop damage per capita
R squared
Cyclone damage per capita (F$)
Housing damaged dummy * Cyclone 
damage per capita
Illness in 2003 dummy
Illness in 2005 dummy
Illness in 2003 * Housing damaged
Illness in 2003 * Crop damage per 
capita
Illness in 2003 * Housing damaged * 
Crop damage per capita




*10% significance, **5% significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Other controls not shown here 
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Table 4. Effects of illness on annual cash-inkind transfers per capita - fixed effects.
α 2 γ 2 α 2
N α 2
V
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Net transfers received
A1. Aggregated transfers
Both 237.1 ** -247.7 ** 253.4 ** -10.5
(91.8) (102.2) (99.2) (47.3)
Across-household 129.0 * -133.5 157.3 * -4.4
(77.7) (87.9) (82.0) (33.9)
Group-household 108.1 * -114.2 * 96.0 -6.2
(55.0) (67.4) (60.5) (39.7)
A2. Disaggregated across-household transfers






(62.6) (76.1) (64.4) (26.0)
Same tokatoka 107.7 -110.5 131.1 * 4.7
(68.4) (82.7) (69.5) (27.5)
Same tokatoka 127.7 * -115.2 132.2 25.9
(tokatoka-time dummies) (73.2) (92.7) (82.6) (32.5)
A3. Disaggregated household-group transfers
Village 12.0 1.5 8.4 14.0
(11.9) (15.3) (12.4) (9.5)
Kin groups 36.9 -32.0 45.2 -4.5
(32.9) (31.7) (38.2) (14.6)
Kin groups 28.8 -28.2 41.9 0.1
(tokatoka-time dummies) (29.0) (31.0) (38.3) (14.2)
Religious groups 39.4 ** -39.2 * 34.4 * 3.3
(17.2) (22.5) (18.0) (15.3)
Religious groups 38.0 ** -35.0 39.5 ** 1.7
(church-time dummies) (17.6) (24.0) (19.3) (18.6)
Religious groups 31.2 * -26.6 25.2 -1.1
(village-church-time dummies) (16.4) (24.4) (15.8) (21.1)
Social groups 19.8 -44.4 8.0 -19.0
(17.5) (30.5) (16.6) (21.8)
B. Gross transfers given to groups
All groups -84.5 * 90.0 -64.5 -0.8
(45.1) (61.9) (46.9) (40.8)
Village -10.2 -2.5 -6.6 -12.4
(10.9) (14.9) (10.7) (9.7)
Kin groups -22.7 19.0 -23.1 -10.7
(tokatoka-time dummies) (19.6) (23.0) (27.4) (11.4)
Religious groups -33.3 ** 34.1 -28.4 * -1.3
(15.7) (21.0) (16.7) (14.8)
Social groups -21.3 48.1 -8.7 20.6
(17.6) (30.3) (16.6) (21.7)
*10% significance, **5% significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Village-time dummies are 
used to control for village-level covariate shocks unless otherwise noted.  